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Abstract
This paper argues that city-region building debates and relatedly ‘‘post-political’’ literatures are
missing critical perspectives on the state, particularly the state’s continued existence as a social
relation and an arena for politics, its role in the regulation of uneven development and
the conflicts and struggles that arise from this. The paper brings the state centrally into
‘‘post-political’’ debates via a critical analysis of the interrelationships between depoliticization
and neoliberalism. Focusing on Sheffield (South Yorkshire, England) in the context of devolution
and deal-making public policy, the paper explores the seemingly consensual vision-making
dynamics of this city region and dissects the tensions around economic governance, welfare
austerity and social inequalities to get a handle on the ‘‘post-political’’ depoliticized state in,
and of, contemporary capitalism.
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Introduction
There has been an increasing focus in recent years on the devolution of economic,
environmental, and social policies through city-region building endeavours (Deas, 2014;
While et al., 2013). The context to this is, ﬁrstly, seeing city regions as the ‘‘scale at which
principal economic interactions occur’’ (Storper et al., 2015: 230) and appropriate for
territorially demarcating and anchoring functional economic areas, and secondly, as
Storper (2013: 4) boldly puts it, ‘‘[c]ity-regions are the principal scale at which people
experience lived reality’’ such that collectively city-regional development is ‘‘more
important than ever.’’ Within this literature, there has been a debate around neoliberalism
where state restructuring involves major changes in organizational forms and structures with
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an increasing role for non-state or quasi-state agencies (Swyngedouw, 2011). This is often
referred to as a ‘‘destatization’’ of a series of former (central) state domains, with the transfer
of responsibilities to civil society organizations that redeﬁnes the state-civil society
relationship ‘‘through the formation of governance beyond the state’’ (Swyngedouw, 2005:
1998). This involves increasingly networked forms of governance in policy ﬁelds, with an
externalization process comprising privatization, contracting-out and deregulation, and
service delivery, and public–private partnerships to ensure policy coordination.
Relatedly, according to ‘‘post-political’’ approaches, this ‘‘regime’’ of governance, which
operates at diﬀerent spatial scales and territorial reaches, is increasing the amount of actors
involved in policy implementation. An array of players, stakeholders and organizations are
playing active roles in the transformation of relations between state and market economy by
also involving and increasing the inﬂuence of corporate interests and the privatization of
public services therein (Haughton et al., 2013; MacLeod, 2013). Correlated to this, power is
being transferred to, or captured by, an elite formation in terms of political, social, and
cultural inﬂuences (Crouch, 2004). Rather than promoting democracy, this new ‘‘regime’’ of
politics can undermine it; governance per se has bypassed direct elected and representative
democracy. Accordingly,
the status, inclusion or exclusion, legitimacy, system of representation, scale of operation and
internal or external accountability of such actors takes place in non-transparent, ad hoc, context
dependent ways and diﬀers greatly from those associated with egalitarian pluralistic democratic
rules and codes. (Swyngedouw, 2010: 6)
One of the key elements to this approach, then, is the parallel role of depoliticization—the
narrowing of the boundaries of democratic politics, the displacement strategies used by
the state to frame engagement, and the emergence of technocratic and delegated forms
of governance (Wood and Flinders, 2014). In the context of neoliberalism, which we
discuss below, this process reinforces dominant ideologies around what is possible,
restricting or foreclosing those avenues for debate around alternative and critical discourses.
This paper suggests that ‘‘post-political’’ approaches downplay or ignore forms of crisis-
management, governance failure and state failure, and the way state policies and institutions
are sites themselves of political mobilization and conﬂict. The ‘‘post-political’’ literatures can
reduce the state to ‘‘the police’’ (Rancie`re, 1999, 2010),1 and consequently the state is no
longer directly seen as a key arena for struggle and political contestation (Dikec¸ and
Swyngedouw, 2017; Swyngedouw, 2017). We challenge this closure and contend that the
state should continue to be seen as a productive arena for performing politics, even, as
Harvey (2013) points out, ‘‘in the midst of immense contemporary skepticism, on both
the left and right of the political spectrum’’ (p. 153). The state is the ‘‘theatre for the
contestation of ideologies,’’ it is the place of the public, and there is no (as yet) credible
alternative forum for mass representation, organized accountability, and the expression and
enactment of collective solidarity (Glaser, 2015: 30). Put simply, the state needs to be
brought back into urban and regional studies.
The paper addresses this enigma with a grounded focus on the politics and struggles of
economic development in and across the city region, especially the economic forces acting
upon them and the actors engaged in struggles to shape such forces in diﬀerent ways within
the state. Following Cumbers et al. (2010: 55), we are ‘‘interested not just in the overt forms
of resistance that emerge at the level of individuals and groups, but also on the daily
struggles of workers and their families to ensure their own social reproduction.’’ A key
element of the politics of city-region building, in particular in the older industrial areas,
has been to give scant recognition to the underlying trend towards declining growth and
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productivity, the ongoing brutal logic of labour-market segmentation, marginalization, and
ﬂexibilization. Related to these labour-market changes, and an outcome of them, are the
shifts in power relations between capital and labour vis-a`-vis the weakening of collective
bargaining and employment rights, which is creating the conditions for control over work
arrangements and the casualization of employment through part-time, temporary, and zero-
hour jobs (Etherington and Jones, 2016a).
Our analysis traces the localization of welfare restructuring and the new geographies of
austerity, alongside the evolving and more media-friendly devolution of skills and
employment initiatives. Drawing on the Sheﬃeld City Region (SCR) and the strategic shifts
in governance and politics embraced by devolution, we explore the politics of welfare reform
and employment policy. We undertake this analysis against a backdrop and context of social
inequalities and austerity policies, identifying and analyzing emerging social struggles and
their conﬂicts. The paper discusses city regions as contested ‘‘post-political’’ spaces and we
make connections between the state, depoliticization, and neoliberalism.
Following Le Gale`s (2016), we are interested in the content of, processes and mechanisms
within, and limits to, the neoliberal growth model. The next section accordingly brings the
state centrally into ‘‘post-political’’ debates via a strategic-relational analysis of the complex
interrelationships between state power, depoliticization, and neoliberalism. This is followed
by a section that explores the development of the UK Conservative Government’s
‘‘devolution revolution’’ by analyzing the Sheﬃeld City Region settlement and the
seemingly consensual vision-making dynamics of this outward-looking city region.2
Section ‘Sheﬃeld City Region Devolution: Depoliticization and repoliticization reactions’
takes issue with this conjecture, suggests devolution is being used to implement austerity
cuts, and analyzes struggle and contestation with respect to implementing employment and
skills policies in the context of deepening inequalities, policy tensions, governance failure,
and repoliticization possibilities. Finally, the implications of our analysis are discussed.
Depoliticization, agency, and the institutional materiality of the state
We advocate an approach to the state that provides nuanced insights into political agency,
actor relations and interest groups, to illustrate how depoliticization occurs as a consequence
of the complex interaction between reﬂexive subjects. We contend that extending Bob
Jessop’s strategic-relational approach (SRA) can both accommodate and operationalize this.
Drawing on the contributions of Gramsci, Poulantzas, and Oﬀe, Jessop (1985, 1990, 2008,
2016) sees the state not as an instrument of capital or class, but as a social relation. The state
is a site, product, and generator of struggle itself, and its spatial form is determined by the
condensation of political forces that are represented in and through the state apparatus.
The state can thus be understood as ﬁrst, varied apparatuses and boundaries according to its
historical and geographical developments as well as its speciﬁc conjunctures. However, there
is a strategic limit to this variation, imposed by the given balance of social forces. Thus,
second, the state has diﬀerential eﬀects on various political and economic strategies in a way
that some are more privileged than others, but at the same time, it is the interaction among
these strategies that results in the exercise of state power. Extending Jessop’s analysis, we
argue that depoliticization is an increasingly important governing strategy for exercising
state power, removing the political character of decision-making by privileging certain
interests in the state-making process, in turn framing politics and shaping political
opportunities. Periodization matters.
For Jessop (2002, 2016), post-war state intervention can be periodized as a shift from a
dominant Keynesian redistributive to a neoliberal market-dominated mode of intervention.
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This is secured through ‘‘spatiotemporal ﬁxes,’’ whereby the state performs the role of
securing the relative stabilization of society by endeavouring to manage the various
economic and political contradictions within the state system. While the Keynesian-
welfare national states of the post-war era were intent on harmonizing the equalization of
wealth, population, and infrastructure across national territories, contemporary neoliberal
state projects are promoting territorial competitiveness within strategic subnational sites
such as city regions, which are to be positioned in turn within global circuits of economic
development.
While certain aspects of this entrepreneurial reorientation of local and regional economic
policy has occurred from below, as ﬁscally strained localities and regional states have
attempted proactively to attract new sources of investment through the actions of ‘‘new
institutional spaces’’ (Jones, 1999), the current ‘‘new new localism’’ must also be construed
as a national state project. Indeed, provoked by hegemonic discourses of globalization and
business acumen alongside a political rhetoric of ﬁscal prudence, national states have actively
sought to reduce commitments to universal welfare entitlements and redistributive urban and
regional policies in favor of supply-side neoliberal interventions intended to promote
technological innovation, labour-market ﬂexibility, and endogenous growth (Jones and
Jessop, 2010).
This neoliberal growth strategy should not be seen as an all-encompassing, universal, and
settled project. As noted above, it is important to highlight the contingent mechanisms or
processes in and through which this project is being politically made and contested with
‘‘some forms of agency’’ to avoid ‘‘overgeneralizations’’ (Le Gale`s, 2016: 168). Following
Oﬀe (1984: 37), we favor a ‘‘processual’’ approach, which seeks out the mechanisms that
generate events and can highlight developmental and counteracting tendencies.
Burnham provides a useful insight into this when he contends that depoliticization was
central to Marx’s critique of capitalism and is a key mechanism for the political management
of an economy. The existence of the state being, among other things, a ‘‘political’’ sphere,
which presupposes the possibility of a depoliticization of civil society, makes it ‘‘clear that
the depoliticisation of civil society could only be achieved through bloody legislation against
the expropriated—producing a ‘‘class’’ free from the means of production and ‘‘free’’ to sell
their labour power—a process that could not in essence be more political’’ (Burnham, 2014:
191). This is contemporized by Wood and Flinders (2014: 152), who emphasize that
depoliticization is a contingent neoliberal political strategy for managing conﬂicts and
rationalizing economic governance, which exhibits three forms:
. Governmental depoliticization: focusing on the switching of issues from the governmental
sphere through the ‘‘delegation’’ of those issues by politicians to arm’s-length bodies,
judicial structures or technocratic rule-based systems that limit discretion;
. Societal depoliticization: involving the transition of issues from the public sphere to the
private sphere and focusing on the existence of choice, capacity deliberation and the shift
towards individualized responses to collective challenges;
. Discursive depolitizisation: the role of language and ideas to depoliticize certain issues and,
through this, deﬁne them as little more than elements of fate.
Allmendinger and Haughton (2015: 44) also consider that neoliberal state agents deploy
three patterns of intervention across these forms for deferring, displacing, and transferring
the political moment and containing, albeit temporarily, crises further. By deferring the
political, the state can enact strategies of deferral of conﬂict to some future point in time.
By displacing, the state can shift political problems to other arenas and groups.
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By transferring the political, conﬂict can be removed from immediate community and
representative processes into new, fuzzy communities of interest and democratic processes
that may not align or map on to experiences of change ‘‘on the ground.’’
In short, depoliticitization characterizes the neoliberal political-administrative state
system, the operation of which requires a careful unpacking of the ‘‘organizational form
and sociopolitical bases of the state’’ (Jessop, 1990: 345). The above accounts oﬀered by
Wood and Flinders (2014) and Allmendinger and Haughton (2015) are helpful in
signposting the key issues, trends, and emerging dynamics of state intervention, but they
give limited conceptual insights into the processual operation of the depoliticized state.
By contrast, for Jessop (2008, 2016), the state is a ‘‘medium and outcome’’ of processes
that constitute its many interventions and the terrain of the state is forged through the
ongoing engagements between agents, institutions, and concrete political and policy
circumstances. In this approach, there is a need to not only examine where state power
takes place (e.g. sites of government and governance) but also how policy and politics are
deﬁned by their contents and in situations where choice, capacity for agency, deliberation,
and social interaction prevail. In short, depoliticization can only be guaranteed through a
process of ‘‘repoliticisation’’ and an assertion of the ‘‘political’’ in and through the state—
underlying the point that both are integral to each other (Jessop, 2014). For Jessop, this
covers, inter alia:
(1) the forms and stakes of normal and/or exceptional politics; (2) the thematisation of issues as
controversial, negotiable or consensual; (3) the subjective identity as well as material and ideal
interests of political agents; (4) their location within, on the margins of, or at a distance from the
state’s institutional architecture; and (5) their positioning relative to the front-or back-stage of
the political scene . . . [Governance projects then] may become objects of political contestation as
attempts occur to establish, deny, or reframe their relevance to the political ﬁeld and changing
policy agendas. These attempts may involve reorganizing the integral state in the shadow of
hierarchy and, indeed, serve to enhance state power by exercising inﬂuence indirectly and/or
at a distance from the state. (Jessop, 2014: 214, emphasis added)
Jessop’s ‘‘integral state in the shadow of hierarchy’’ has six dimensions, summarized and
extended by our analysis in Table 1, which points to how the city-region-state nexus operates
not just in relation to the state’s organization form and socio-political bases but also how
crises, contradictions, depoliticized politics, and struggles can emerge within a devolved
governance framework and create opportunities.
As noted in Table 1, the ﬁrst three dimensions capture the state’s institutional relations
within the political and policy system. This SRA approach identiﬁes a mode of representation
to delimit patterns of representation and the state in its inclusive sense. This uncovers the
territorial agents, political parties, state oﬃcials, community groups, para-state institutions,
regimes, and coalitions that are incorporated into the state’s everyday policy-making
practices. Alongside this, Jessop (2016: 66) identiﬁes modes of articulation. This is the
institutional embodiment of the above and it underscores the distribution of powers
through diﬀerent geographical divisions and departments of the state and its policy
systems. This explores the ways in which political strategy helps to create spaces and
scales of policy intervention and delivery. Last, Jessop (2016: 70) introduces modes of
intervention to analyze the diﬀerent political and ideological rule systems that govern state
intervention. In eﬀect, through depoliticization as a governing strategy, read across these
three dimensions of the state, state managers are able to spatially reorganize the state
apparatus to retain arm’s-length control over crucial economic and social processes, while
simultaneously beneﬁting from the distancing eﬀects of depoliticization. As a form
Etherington and Jones 5
T
a
b
le
1
.
Si
x
d
im
e
n
si
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
st
at
e
,
cr
is
is
te
n
d
e
n
ci
e
s,
an
d
d
e
p
o
lit
ic
iz
at
io
n
p
ro
ce
ss
e
s.
St
at
e
d
im
e
n
si
o
n
D
e
fin
it
io
n
SR
A
lin
k
ag
e
C
ri
si
s
as
p
e
ct
s
D
e
p
o
lit
ic
iz
at
io
n
p
ro
ce
ss
e
s:
st
ra
te
gi
e
s,
to
o
ls
an
d
ta
ct
ic
s
G
o
ve
rn
m
e
n
ta
l
d
im
e
n
si
o
n
s
ca
p
tu
ri
n
g
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
re
la
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
in
th
e
p
o
lit
ic
al
an
d
p
o
lic
y
sy
st
e
m
M
o
d
e
o
f
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
(r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
na
l
re
gi
m
e)
T
h
e
se
gi
ve
so
ci
al
fo
rc
e
s
ac
ce
ss
to
th
e
st
at
e
ap
p
ar
at
u
s
an
d
to
it
s
ca
p
ac
it
ie
s
U
n
e
q
u
al
ac
ce
ss
to
st
at
e
U
n
e
q
u
al
ab
ili
ty
to
re
si
st
at
d
is
ta
n
ce
fr
o
m
st
at
e
U
n
e
q
u
al
ca
p
ac
it
y
to
sh
ap
e
,
m
ak
e
,
an
d
im
p
le
m
e
n
t
d
e
ci
si
o
n
s
C
ri
si
s
o
f
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
R
e
o
rd
e
ri
n
g
o
f
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
al
re
gi
m
e
s,
d
iff
e
re
n
ti
al
ly
in
co
rp
o
ra
ti
n
g
n
ew
in
te
re
st
s
(f
o
rm
s
o
f
‘‘o
n
th
e
sc
e
n
e
’’)
in
to
th
e
st
at
e
ap
p
ar
at
u
s
to
p
ro
m
o
te
an
d
re
w
o
rk
in
g
fo
rc
e
s
an
d
ca
p
ac
it
ie
s
to
e
x
cl
u
d
e
in
te
re
st
s
M
o
d
e
o
f
ar
ti
cu
la
ti
o
n
(i
nt
er
na
l
st
ru
ct
ur
es
of
th
e
st
at
e)
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
ar
ch
it
e
ct
u
re
o
f
th
e
le
ve
l
an
d
b
ra
n
ch
e
s
o
f
th
e
st
at
e
U
n
e
q
u
al
ca
p
ac
it
y
to
sh
ap
e
,
m
ak
e
,
an
d
im
p
le
m
e
n
t
d
e
ci
si
o
n
s
C
ri
si
s
o
f
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
in
te
gr
at
io
n
R
e
o
rg
an
is
in
g
th
e
st
at
e
ap
p
ar
at
u
s
th
ro
u
gh
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
/s
e
lf-
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
,
go
ve
rn
m
e
n
t/
go
ve
rn
an
ce
,
h
o
llo
w
in
g-
o
u
t/
fil
lin
g-
in
,
re
-
an
d
d
e
ce
n
tr
al
is
at
io
n
,a
n
d
st
e
e
ri
n
g
th
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
p
o
w
e
r
vi
a
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
fix
e
s
an
d
b
al
an
ci
n
g
ge
o
gr
ap
h
ic
al
d
iv
is
io
n
s
(f
o
rm
s
o
f
‘‘c
o
lli
b
ra
ti
o
n
’’)
M
o
d
e
s
o
f
in
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
(p
at
te
rn
s
of
In
te
rv
en
tio
n)
M
o
d
e
s
o
f
in
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
in
si
d
e
th
e
st
at
e
an
d
b
ey
o
n
d
it
D
iff
e
re
n
t
si
te
s
an
d
m
e
ch
an
is
m
s
o
f
in
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
fo
r
d
e
fe
rr
in
g,
d
is
p
la
ci
n
g
an
d
tr
an
sf
e
rr
in
g
cr
is
is
fr
o
m
th
e
e
co
n
o
m
ic
to
th
e
p
o
lit
ic
al
fo
rm
(f
ro
m
th
e
m
ar
ke
t
to
th
e
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
sy
st
e
m
)
an
d
p
o
lit
ic
al
m
o
m
e
n
ts
th
e
re
af
te
r
R
at
io
n
al
it
y
cr
is
is
R
ew
o
rk
in
g
st
at
e
in
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
an
d
th
e
p
o
lic
y
fie
ld
b
y
d
e
lim
it
in
g
m
e
ch
an
is
m
s:
p
u
b
lic
/p
ri
va
te
an
d
(r
e
p
ri
va
ti
zi
n
g)
,
u
n
iv
er
sa
l/
se
le
ct
iv
e
,
q
u
al
it
y/
co
m
p
e
ti
ti
o
n
,
an
d
in
cl
u
si
ve
/
e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
,e
tc
.U
si
n
g
sp
at
io
-t
e
m
p
o
ra
l
fix
e
s
to
al
te
r
p
at
te
rn
s
o
f
st
at
e
in
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
an
d
p
o
lic
y-
m
ak
in
g
re
p
e
rt
o
ir
e
s
sp
at
ia
lly
an
d
te
m
p
o
ra
lly
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
)
6 Environment and Planning A 0(0)
T
a
b
le
1
.
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
.
St
at
e
d
im
e
n
si
o
n
D
e
fin
it
io
n
SR
A
lin
k
ag
e
C
ri
si
s
as
p
e
ct
s
D
e
p
o
lit
ic
iz
at
io
n
p
ro
ce
ss
e
s:
st
ra
te
gi
e
s,
to
o
ls
an
d
ta
ct
ic
s
So
ci
e
ta
l
d
im
e
n
si
o
n
s
ca
p
tu
ri
n
g
th
e
w
id
e
r
so
ci
al
re
la
ti
o
n
s
an
d
d
is
cu
rs
iv
e
d
o
m
ai
n
s
So
ci
al
b
as
is
o
f
th
e
st
at
e
(s
oc
ia
l
ba
se
s
of
st
at
e
p
ow
er
)
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
iz
e
d
so
ci
al
co
m
p
ro
m
is
e
U
n
ev
e
n
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
m
at
e
ri
al
an
d
sy
m
b
o
lic
co
n
ce
ss
io
n
s
to
th
e
‘‘p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
’’
in
o
rd
e
r
to
se
cu
re
su
p
p
o
rt
fo
r
th
e
st
at
e
,
st
at
e
p
ro
je
ct
s,
sp
e
ci
fic
p
o
lic
y
se
ts
,
an
d
h
e
ge
m
o
n
ic
vi
si
o
n
s
C
ri
si
s
o
f
th
e
p
o
w
e
r
b
lo
c
D
is
af
fe
ct
io
n
w
it
h
p
ar
ti
e
s
an
d
th
e
st
at
e
C
iv
il
u
n
re
st
,
ci
vi
l
w
ar
,
re
vo
lu
ti
o
n
C
h
an
ge
s
to
th
e
st
at
e
’s
so
ci
al
an
d
‘‘s
p
at
io
-t
e
m
p
o
ra
l
se
le
ct
iv
it
y’
’
to
in
cl
u
d
e
/e
x
cl
u
d
e
o
r
p
ri
vi
le
ge
/
d
is
p
ri
vi
le
ge
so
m
e
co
al
it
io
n
p
o
ss
ib
ili
ti
e
s
an
d
in
te
re
st
gr
o
u
p
s,
p
ro
m
o
te
o
r
am
e
lio
ra
te
u
n
ev
e
n
d
ev
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
St
at
e
p
ro
je
ct
(a
cc
um
ul
at
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
an
d
st
at
e
st
ra
te
gi
es
)
Se
cu
re
s
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
al
u
n
it
y
o
f
th
e
st
at
e
an
d
it
s
ca
p
ac
it
y
to
ac
t
L
in
ke
d
to
m
o
d
e
s
o
f
in
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
.
O
ve
rc
o
m
e
s
im
p
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
o
f
u
n
ifi
e
d
st
at
e
sy
st
e
m
b
y
o
ri
e
n
ti
n
g
st
at
e
ag
e
n
ci
e
s
an
d
ag
e
n
ts
L
e
gi
ti
m
at
io
n
cr
is
is
R
ew
o
rk
in
g
th
e
b
al
an
ce
b
e
tw
e
e
n
fo
rm
s
o
f
go
ve
rn
m
e
n
t,
go
ve
rn
an
ce
,
an
d
‘‘m
e
ta
-g
o
ve
rn
an
ce
’’
(t
h
e
go
ve
rn
an
ce
o
f
go
ve
rn
an
ce
)
to
p
ro
vi
d
e
co
m
p
ro
m
is
e
co
h
e
re
n
ce
s
o
r
fle
x
ib
le
p
o
lic
y-
m
ak
in
g
re
p
e
rt
o
ir
e
s/
sh
ift
in
g
p
o
lic
y
p
ar
ad
ig
m
s
H
e
ge
m
o
n
ic
vi
si
o
n
(h
eg
em
on
ic
p
ro
je
ct
)
D
e
fin
e
s
n
at
u
re
an
d
p
u
rp
o
se
o
f
th
e
st
at
e
fo
r
th
e
w
id
e
r
so
ci
al
fo
rm
at
io
n
P
ro
vi
d
e
s
le
gi
ti
m
ac
y
fo
r
th
e
st
at
e
,
d
e
fin
e
d
in
te
rm
s
o
f
p
ro
m
o
ti
n
g
co
m
m
o
n
go
o
d
,
e
tc
.
C
ri
si
s
o
f
h
e
ge
m
o
n
y
‘‘S
e
m
io
si
s’
’(
se
n
se
an
d
m
e
an
in
g
m
ak
in
g)
,
‘‘c
o
n
st
ru
al
’’
th
ro
u
gh
‘‘s
p
at
ia
l
im
ag
in
ar
ie
s’
’
(i
d
e
n
ti
fic
at
io
n
o
f
p
ro
b
le
m
s/
go
al
s/
b
la
m
e
an
d
m
o
b
ili
sa
ti
o
n
o
f
so
lu
ti
o
n
s/
vi
si
o
n
s)
Sc
ie
n
ti
sa
ti
o
n
,
u
se
o
f
th
in
k
-t
an
k
s,
as
se
m
b
la
ge
s
o
f
‘‘e
x
p
e
rt
s,
’’
n
ew
in
te
lle
ct
u
al
s
So
u
rc
e
:
C
o
lu
m
n
s
1
–
4
(J
e
ss
o
p
,
2
0
1
6
:
T
ab
le
3
.1
,
p
.
5
8
),
co
lu
m
n
5
(a
u
th
o
rs
’
ad
d
it
io
n
).
Etherington and Jones 7
of politics, then, in addition to shielding the government from the consequences of such
unpopular policies, depoliticization also shapes market expectations via rationalist
assumptions regarding the credibility of policy-making.
The second set of three dimensions captures the state’s ‘‘inner-dwelling’’ (Jessop, 1990:
345) and the overarching forces in the political and policy system (see Table 1). As any
substantive unity that the state possesses only derives from (but can never be guaranteed
through) speciﬁc political projects, the state’s wider social relations are key for securing
integration and cohesion. Jessop (2016: 71) introduces the social basis of the state to draw
attention to the consolidation of the representational regime through civil society, i.e. those
social forces outside the political system. Jessop (2016: 84) adds that just as accumulation
strategies are needed to bring a coherence and direction to the circuit of capital, state projects
are required to bring some guidance and coherence to the manifold activities of the state.
Discursive domains are also important for uncovering the internal unity and modes of
policy-making and in terms of securing the state’s purpose for the wider society. Jessop
notes the importance of hegemonic visions to examine language and other semiotic codes
that enact ideological programmes of action, i.e. how forms of knowledge and discourses
become codiﬁed and mobilized to advance particular interests (Jessop, 2016: 86). The
construal of hegemonic projects (in part through the mobilization of a social base of
support within spatial imaginaries) can prove decisive in resolving (albeit temporarily and
unevenly) the conﬂicts between particular interests. Depoliticization, read across these three
dimensions of the state, thus operates through hegemony-seeking ‘‘discursive institutions’’
(Fuller, 2017), which establish semantic links between the discursive aims of those seeking to
control and the pragmatics of the everyday lives of those subject to such institutions.
As these are socially constructed by particular actors and involve the operation of
particular broader societal values, these dimensions stress the contingency of political
decisions and the inescapable power relations that are involved in depoliticizing contexts
(Jessop, 2016: 88–90).
As Newman, however, demonstrates, the construction of ‘‘hegemonic projects’’ is a highly
contested process within and between localities. Negotiating neoliberalism, in what Newman
terms ‘‘landscapes of antagonism,’’ thus needs to be contextualized within a ‘‘contradictory
ﬁeld of political forces’’ where,
the vibrancy of local democracy can serve as a challenge to hegemonic projects . . .Landscapes of
antagonism are formed (and reformed) through the discursive constitution of new subjects and
the orchestration of new lines of antagonism, resistance and alignment . . . [and] local
governments are both actors in such landscapes of antagonism, with their own interests and
political projects, and the mediators of wider struggles in which they seek to privilege some and
mitigate others. (Newman, 2014: 3298–3299)
The challenge is to demonstrate these processes and analyze the complex mechanisms
shaping emergent forms of regional and urban governance. We undertake this below,
focusing on the Sheﬃeld City Region to re-state the post-political, particularly
emphasizing the processual dynamics of structure and struggle taking place within the
internal organization of the state and state-policy formation.
The politics of devolution and welfare-to-work
In the 1980s, as a result of a prolonged economic crisis, rising unemployment and extensive
de-industrialization that was an outcome of the Thatcher Government monetarist and free-
market accumulation strategies, Sheﬃeld became a focal point of resistance to the
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Conservative Government’s national state project. Labour-controlled local authorities took
a proactive role in developing alternative modes of intervention by prioritizing local economic
initiatives (employment and training) to promote a more redistributive and inclusive local
state. Between 1979 and 1982, for instance, 45,000 jobs were shed in the core engineering and
steel industries within the Sheﬃeld local authority area alone. Added to this, the damaging
eﬀects of the 2008 economic and ﬁnancial crisis (Townsend and Champion, 2014) and weak
economic growth has led to a further ‘‘prosperity gap’’ of over »1.1 billion due to a
combination of economic inactivity, unemployment, and low-productivity sectors. Policy-
makers have accordingly calculated that Sheﬃeld needs to create around 120,000 jobs to
close the gap with the national average by 2024 and ‘‘nowhere in the UK grows at this rate
for such a sustained period of time’’ (Sheﬃeld City Region LEP, 2014: 22).
Depoliticization processes have been at work throughout the 1980s and 1990s, deferring,
displacing, and transferring the crisis of this economy into more politically manageable state
projects to promote regional and local economic development. This has been crucial for
those seeking to govern uneven spatial development and deal with the political problems
arising from this. Sheﬃeld witnessed an ongoing reworking of neoliberal modes of
articulation, spatially reorganizing the internal structures of the state and patterns of
intervention to give unequal access and capacity to shape, make, and implement state
strategy. Issues of economic management were displaced from the governmental sphere
through the ‘‘delegation’’ of those issues by politicians to arm’s-length bodies, judicial
structures or technocratic rule-based systems that limit discretion. Shifts within the mode
of representation saw a raft of private sector-led initiatives being developed, including
Training and Enterprise Councils as quasi-devolved bodies to cities and subregions
charged with developing the skills and training market. Despite there being evidence-
based limits to creating an employer-led training market, New Labour continued this
depoliticization process via a hegemonic vision of promoting employer interests at all
costs. Learning and Skills Councils, along with Regional Development Agencies (RDAs)
and Sector Skills Councils, were charged with coordinating skills strategies across the region.
The transitions within and between these new governing arrangements have lacked clarity
and accountability, forming part of a broader depoliticized mode of intervention aimed at
normalizing neoliberalism through the institutionalization of economic paradigms (such as
the primacy of the market, deregulation, and privatization) and with central government
state managers retaining control and distancing themselves from unpopular policies.
As noted above, a central element of depoliticization is the rescaling of modes of
intervention to localities for the ‘‘management’’ of the social reproduction of labour,
reorganising class alliances among dominant class fractions and disorganising subordinate
classes and forces, whether through divide-and-rule tactics or through a national-popular
interest that transcends particular class interests (Jessop, 2014: 214). Sheﬃeld’s state strategy
for tackling unemployment and ‘‘worklessness’’ is indicative of this and how the
depoliticization of the unemployment problem operates. The City Strategy Pathﬁnder
(CSP) pilot, targeted at major de-industrialised conurbations, was accordingly established
in 2006 with the primary aims of devolving welfare-to-work programmes for tackling
worklessness and integrating employment and skills strategies. The CSP was seen as a
vehicle to promote an element of devolved responsibility to local partnerships in
delivering pathways and presented as a bottom-up process—partnerships and consortia
were formed by local employment services along with local authorities, the private,
voluntary, and community sectors where there was some discretion given to innovate with
project development. In many respects, a wider Sheﬃeld City Region building project was to
emerge from the CSP, which was initially geographically conﬁned to South Yorkshire local
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authorities and then expanded to the local authorities covering the North East Derbyshire
coalﬁeld. In terms of Jessop’s (2016) social basis of the state, a new institutionalized social
compromise was emerging, based around ‘‘multi-city regionalism’’ (Wachsmuth, 2016).
Instead of addressing uneven development within these localities, changes were taking
place to the state’s ‘‘spatial selectivity’’ (Jones, 1999; see also Omstedt, 2016) for
depoliticizing inequality by drawing local government further into the normalization of
neoliberalism through the promotion of uneven development between city regions.
The Sheﬃeld City Region Development Programme, which set out how the local
authorities believed that by working together and with the business sector as a city
region, they could increase the economic output of the area (12.6% by 2016), further
embodied and embedded depoliticization through modes of representation. The economic
context to city-region governance building at this conjuncture is important to understand;
one of increasing labour-market inequalities and socioeconomic exclusion as a result of the
2008 recession. Within the SCR, for instance, there are 85,640 people claiming Employment
Support Allowance (ESA)/Incapacity Beneﬁt (IB) and 16,090 claiming disability beneﬁts.3
Furthermore, in-work poverty has become a major issue with signiﬁcant numbers of people
paid below the Living Wage (currently »8.45 an hour). It is not only the rates of pay that are
important but also the hours of work. As a result of the scale of (full-time) manufacturing
job losses, the SCR has created fewer new full-time jobs in the last growth period when
compared to other leading city regions. As highlighted by the Sheﬃeld Independent
Economic Review, this diﬀerence in the balance of full-time to part-time job creation is
one of the key deﬁning features of low-performing city-region areas (Sheﬃeld City Region
LEP, 2013, 2016).
Against this low-skills equilibrium backdrop, Sheﬃeld’s post-2015 ‘‘Devolution
Agreement’’ has been concerned with locally making more with skills and
employment—local councils and businesses have been promised the control of a »150
million skills budget (2015–2021) for ‘‘building a new skills system’’ (HM Government,
2015). This ‘‘Devolution Deal,’’ totaling »900 million over other policy areas, builds on
previous ‘‘City Deals’’ as deal-making state projects for orienting state agencies and
agents, with the diﬀerence being the requirement to elect a metro mayor (a
representational instance of depoliticization through an appeal to populism) to access
devolved economic-development budgets. For Wharton (2016), then Conservative Party
Minister for the wider ‘‘Northern Powerhouse’’ initiative, this positions places like
Sheﬃeld as: ‘‘local areas [which could] now look forward to real control . . . devolution has
arrived and is here to stay. It will require local business and civic leaders to take
ownership . . . and maintain the momentum of growth’’ (pp.8–9). Attempts made to secure
further operational unity of the state and its capacity to act for this saw the introduction of
new state projects, such as a Sheﬃeld City Region Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP),
superseding the Yorkshire Forward RDA, without an evaluation of the success of the
RDA model of governance (Pike et al., 2016). Legitimacy for LEPs has been secured by
further widening the social basis of the state through local government, albeit ‘‘an unstable
equilibrium of compromise’’ (Jessop, 2016: 72), with the creation of a Sheﬃeld City Region
Combined Authority (SCRCA).
‘‘SCR2040’’ is the epitome of a consensual depoliticized call-to-arms vision for the
Sheﬃeld City Region (SCR Vision, 2017). Targeted by SCRCA at bolstering support for
the devolution deal, Figure 1 captures the press coverage of the A Better Future Together
prospectus for the Sheﬃeld City Region. Here, the SCRCA, locality education and health
bosses unite—booster-style—around the digital, creative and logistics sectors, ‘‘fab-labs,’’
opportunities for a factory 2050 ‘‘fourth industrial revolution’’ based on apprenticeships and
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innovation districts, and better internal and external connectivity to facilitate agglomeration
through competition. This represents a powerful, no-discussion, hegemonic vision to
legitimize state intervention by framing policy problems and mobilizing support behind a
spatial imaginary vision (in this case Sheﬃeld as a one-road, high-skills, knowledge-based
economy). As this deﬁnes the nature and purpose of the state for the wider social formation
though, the state apparatus remains the conduit for neoliberalism via ‘‘post-politicizing
processes . . . channeled into post-democratic forms of consensual policy-making [which]
cannot be questioned’’ (Haughton et al., 2016: 477). SCR2040 argues that ‘‘we cannot
leave it to our elected representatives’’ (SCR Vision, 2017: 24), such partisanship must be
cast aside for the ‘‘common good.’’ Sheﬃeld’s residents are asked not to question or debate
these issues, but to ‘‘read it, decide how they can help . . . and make a pledge of support’’
(Moore, 2017: 5) and ‘‘back bold decisions’’ (Mothersole, 2017: 18). By depoliticizing
economic choice, SCR2040 further normalizes neoliberalism. There is no mention of
Figure 1. Manufacturing a Sheffield Post-Political Consensus.
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distribution, inequality, or poverty; the liberation of markets and privatization continues at
pace.4 Put bluntly:
The new devolution arrangements are not the product of wider public debate in the areas to be
aﬀected by them, but instead are the outcomes of ‘secret deals’ (City Deals, ‘Devolution Deals’,
etc.) between the political and business elites at the national and local levels . . . [T]he model of
devolution currently on oﬀer is one designed to advance [a] narrowly deﬁned set of business
interests with very little democratic scrutiny. (Tomaney, 2016: 550)
A key element of this Devolution Agreement, which has involved little public discussion or
debate, is the emerging post-Work Programme (WP) mode of intervention between the
central government Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) and SCRCA partners for
piloting changes to and co-designing the future of welfare-to-work programmes to operate at
the city-region scale from the end of 2017. The WP was established in 2011 by the former
Coalition Government and designed to deliver personalized services via ‘‘private contractor
market actors’’ (Dean, 2009: 3) to people who have signiﬁcant barriers to work or who are
on long-term sickness beneﬁts. The WP ‘‘contract areas’’ territorially cut across SCRCA
administrative boundaries (as it covers the South Yorkshire contract area and part of the
East Midlands contract area), which reinforces the operation and fragmentation of the
welfare market by shaping the internal structures of the state and patterns of intervention
to ‘‘facilitate the process of neoliberalism through ﬂexibility and variability’’ (Haughton
et al., 2013: 217).
The localization agenda now involves bringing target groups into employment—those on
long-term sickness beneﬁts and with disabilities. This contains a tough medical Work
Capability Assessment, which is designed to determine eligibility for sickness beneﬁts such
as ESA. Local authorities also have their own employment and welfare modes of intervention
to support more marginalized groups at a city-region scale. Sheﬃeld City Council, for
instance, operates an Apprenticeship Programme across the SCRCA and other local
authorities run a city-region-wide programme (called Ambition) targeting young people
and providing support into employment and training.
Devolution and city-region building are being implicitly used to implement welfare cuts
and deliver austerity. The roll-out of Universal Credit (UC), ‘‘the biggest change to the
welfare system since its creation’’ (Foley, 2017: 3) and one which will aﬀect 69,000
households across Sheﬃeld alone, involves the twin movement of slashing by merging
six diﬀerent beneﬁts with a tapering system linked to in-work beneﬁts and wages designed
to ‘‘make work pay.’’ This requires a more disciplinary and conditional welfare system
through a tougher claimant regime in which sanctions are an integral feature (see below).
In turn, ‘‘in-work conditionality’’ is a central feature of UC, with the requirement for
claimants to attain ‘‘earning thresholds’’ set at the level of eﬀort reasonable for an
individual to undertake. Working-age adults are subject to conditionality until they are
working full time (35 hours) at National Minimum Wage. If someone is earning below the
conditionality cut-oﬀ point, they are expected to ‘‘look for work, more work or better
paid work’’ (see HM Government, 2016b). In short, the localization of welfare performs
societal depoliticization by transferring aspects of social policy from the (collective)
public to the (individualised) private sphere, articulated locally through the changing
internal structures of the state. As we highlight below, although ‘‘the politics of
austerity can be interpreted as a long-term strategic oﬀensive designed to reorganize the
institutional matrix and balance of forces in favour of capital’’ (Jessop, 2016: 235),
challenges to this are occurring within the state, ‘‘exploiting the bloc’s fragilities’’
(Jessop, 2016: 237).
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Sheffield City Region Devolution: Depoliticization
and repoliticization reactions
The dynamic interrelationship between the two processes of depoliticization and
repoliticization is appearing in the contemporary rolling out of devolution, which has in
turn generated open political conﬂict and opposition. Three examples demonstrate the
importance and role of agency with respect to the state as a social relation, arena of
struggle, and the ‘‘theatre for the contestation of ideologies’’ (Glaser, 2015).
First, Sheﬃeld City Council organized an event on devolution attended by civil-society
leaders, to provide opportunities for critical voices to express concerns around the Northern
Powerhouse state project (see Sheﬃeld First Partnership, 2016). A round-table discussion
and panel session noted the limits to the clustering forces of agglomeration and pointed to
geographies of uneven development:
The ﬁrst unanimous issue raised was that of social inequalities, with delegates noting
the economic emphasis of the deal and the devolution debate in general, and wondering how
devolution will serve to combat inequalities and increase fairness. In particular there were
concerns that in discussions on the economy the question of how growth alleviates poverty is
often lost. Though delegates agreed that growth is an important contributory factor in improving
people’s lives, it is not the only one and the links between economic growth and lessening of
inequalities need to be drawn more clearly. Relatedly, concerns exist that action is required to
address some of the structural inequalities that exist in Sheﬃeld in order to make the most of the
opportunities of devolution. Growth will be best achieved if citizens have the opportunity and
skills to participate but there is a sense that this is not the case at the moment; for example,
delegates asked whether we will create an Advanced Manufacturing Innovation District only to
import employees? (Sheﬃeld First Partnership, 2016: 10)
Through our research, the voluntary and community sector expressed a similar viewpoint in
their response to the devolution deal. According to one source:
We also believe there is a case for constructing a ‘social deal’ to sit alongside the present
economic, employment, planning and infrastructure deal. Without this, we are concerned that
growth will not be inclusive, and that we may see growing inequalities and the risks that emanate
from this despite overall better economic performance. (Voluntary and Community Sector,
Interview, 2016)
Second, the closure of the government’s Business Innovation and Skills oﬃces in Sheﬃeld is
creating civil-service redundancies and transfers, with resulting demonstrations and strikes
(organized by the employment services trade union Public and Commercial Services Union)
against this cost-cutting endeavor (under the banner of ‘‘Northern Poor House, Not
Powerhouse’’—see RSA, 2016: 6). The links and tensions between austerity and devolution
have indeed surfaced in the SheﬃeldCityRegion, and this has brought into sharp focus how the
‘‘devolution revolution’’ (HMGovernment, 2016a) underpins, manages, and at the same time
is threated by, austerity. Table 2 summarizes the dynamics of these processes taking place in
and through the state apparatus as an assemblage of social relations.
Third, the implementation of the extensive welfare market within the Sheﬃeld City
Region has raised further issues and tensions around modes of representation
accountabilities with respect to employment and skills programmes, in particular the
Work Programme. The lack of transparency and engagement by WP providers with local
actors and partnerships has been seen as a key source of tensions in the decentralisation of
welfare-to-work programmes in the UK (Finn, 2015). This is certainly the case within the
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Sheﬃeld City Region: widespread technocratic criticism of the performance of the WP
providers exists and local authorities and agencies express a view that the DWP is not
fully aware of what the providers actually deliver. This is indicative of how this output-
centred and contractual governance mode of intervention limits certain forms of engagement
(Raco et al., 2016). As one local authority oﬃcer stated:
There is no published data on the volume of referrals made to these learning providers,
on what their geographic coverage is, or the nature of skills provision and outcomes.
The policy-making process and its evaluation aren’t known locally within this city region.
(Interview, 2016)
Welfare, conditionality, Employment and skills systems
The impact of welfare reforms on poverty and social inequality has been an intensely
contested issue at the national level (see HM Government, 2016b), and these tensions
Table 2. Sheffield city region: social regulation, reproduction and political struggle.
Key policy
interventions Tensions and conflicts
Agency/(key actors) and sites of negotiation
and struggle
City region growth
strategy,
Northern
Powerhouse
Growth versus distribution and
inclusion, funding for
devolution deals
Within executive board of combined
authority, local authority interests on Board
around benefits of growth, Northern
Powerhouse and LA articulating inclusion
agendas, Trade union and some LA
pressure mobilization around nature of
growth agenda (national and regional TUC)
Apprenticeships
and skills, area
reviews
Cuts to skills funding, including
Adult Skills Budget, European
funded skills programmes,
extent of employer buy-in in
face of recession, quality of
provision and limited access
to advanced skills by
disadvantaged groups to skills
Skills providers especially Further Education
Colleges, (playing an advocacy role for
disadvantaged groups), Work Programme
providers, trade unions negotiating funding
gaps in work representation around
apprenticeship quality
Welfare to work
and benefit
conditionality
Impact of austerity increasing
labour market marginalization
and working poor, Cuts in
funding and PBR model,
negative impact of
conditionality and sanctions,
delays in benefit, tough
claimant regime
Work Programme sub-contractors, Local
authority employment and anti- poverty
strategies and role of anti-poverty
coalitions, disability rights organisations
advice services (using the benefit appeal
system), Voluntary and community sector
and trade union advocacy oppositional
politics against cuts mobilizing and
representing disadvantaged groups
Social, health and
community
support services
Impact of austerity on both local
authorities and disadvantaged
groups, Local authority
conflicts with public sector
trade unions
Local authorities, front line services and Work
Programme providers, NHS providers,
Advice Services—advocacy for benefit
claimants, Trade union opposition to cuts in
services and jobs
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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have been deeply experienced in the Sheﬃeld City Region. Several initiatives illustrate the
importance and impact of struggle and contestation in and against this neoliberal mode of
intervention. First, the action taken by Unite trade union against Sports Direct, a mass-
production sportswear company, whose headquarters are located in Shirebrook (in the
Bolsover District). This has been against low-pay, zero-hours contracts and poor working
conditions, which has had major national impacts as both local and national actors and
campaigns have successfully brought the company to account through the government’s
Select Committee evidence process (Goodley and Ashby, 2015). Second, local authorities,
advice organizations, and anti-poverty coalitions have been very outspoken, seeking to
mobilize advocacy on behalf of residents within the welfare system. Accordingly to one
particularly vocal organization:
The circumstances of people coming through our doors are far worse than those of the 1980s.
Reliance on foodbanks, beneﬁt sanctions on a massive scale, sick or disabled workers, without a
hope of being employed, found ‘ﬁt for work’, are some of the issues that our team of advisers
have dealt with this year. Policies which are supposed to be about helping people to move closer
to the labour market are in many cases damaging to health, self-defeating, and, at their very
worst, causing deaths and contributing to suicides. (Derbyshire Unemployed Workers’ Centre,
Interview, 2015)
As noted above, one of the features of the government localization welfare reforms is the
increasing use of beneﬁt sanctions (Webster, 2015) as a national state project of disciplining
beneﬁt claimants, while at the same time depoliticizing the unemployment and job-gap
problem and undermining the safety net provided by social beneﬁts (Fletcher et al., 2016).
The signiﬁcant number of beneﬁt sanctions implemented in the Sheﬃeld City Region (at
approximately 70,000 sanctions between 2012 and 2015)5 has been the subject of intense
criticism among local authorities, advice services and welfare workers. Local authorities
have borne the brunt of the sanctions in terms of the pressures on their welfare and
support services and have accordingly articulated opposition to the use of sanctions and
the way other tools of beneﬁt conditionality are leading to the increasing impoverishment of
claimants. For example, Rotherham MBC (2014), Sheﬃeld Citizens Advice Bureaux
(Arnold, 2014) and Derbyshire network of advice centres (Needham, 2015) have all
voiced concerns about claimants in many cases being unfairly (incorrectly against the
DWP guidelines) sanctioned and seeing their beneﬁts cease. Disability rights
organizations, trade unions, and community coalitions have run campaigns against such
beneﬁt sanctions, involving picketing the Job Centre network and seeking to raise the proﬁle
of the issue through publicity campaigns, as the impact of sanctions combined with beneﬁt
cuts is creating serious ﬁnancial hardships for vulnerable groups (Involve Yorkshire and
Humber, 2014). At the same time, Derbyshire Unemployed Workers’ Centre has successfully
won tribunals and appeals on beneﬁt-sanctions decisions through representation, which
underlines the importance of advocacy via the formal political system for those
negotiating the beneﬁt system from within the state. This illustrates how policy
implementation happens as a consequence of the ‘‘complex interaction between reﬂexive
subjects involved in multiple relations of power and objective factors that present
opportunities and constraints on actions’’ (Prior and Barnes, 2011: 267) and how the
unemployed and the socially excluded exercise purposeful agency in ‘‘collective practices’’
(Wright, 2012: 316, emphasis original). According to one source:
Each year we deal with over 9,000 enquiries at our centres and outreach venues. We have
recovered over »3 million in lump-sum payments and increased weekly beneﬁts for the people
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of Derbyshire. This money is vital both for the recipients, but also for the regeneration of the
local economy. Money gained is mostly spent locally helping to preserve jobs and aid local
businesses. (Derbyshire Unemployed Workers’ Centre, Interview, 2016)
The hegemonic project and policy debate though are largely construed around unemployed
and disadvantaged groups becoming ‘‘employable’’ and obtaining the ‘‘right skills’’ to obtain
employment. The views of stakeholders consider that employers as well as the employment
services have an important role to play. The evidence submitted to the Sheﬃeld Fairness
Commission (2013: 42) indicates, ‘‘that people from deprived communities are often trapped
in ‘poor’ work with low pay, poor working conditions, long hours and job insecurity.’’ Once
people have obtained qualiﬁcations, there are no guarantees of progression in employment,
given the nature of pay, work organization, job design, casualization and the increasing use
of zero-hours contracts. This is indicative, on Jessop’s (2016) terms, of a depoliticization
transference shift occurring towards individualized responses to collective challenges in the
state’s mode of intervention: ‘‘a further move from national welfare states to more
postnational workfare regimes in advanced capital states and a reinforcement of current
tendencies towards enduring states of austerity’’ (p. 246).
The politics of ‘‘States of Austerity’’ in the city region
As noted above, an underlying tension exists in the Sheﬃeld City Region between the
somewhat consensual hegemonic vision of promoting growth (see SCR Vision, 2017) within
the context and backdrop of a state project of austerity and welfare cuts. Beatty and Fothergill
(2016) demonstrate that the greatest loss in the income of working-age adults occurred in the
more deprived local authorities. For example, two local authority districts within the
SCRCA, Bolsover and Barnsley, are in the top 50 districts in the UK worst aﬀected by the
reforms. Also, as Table 3 shows, the largest loss in income occurs through the changes in tax
credits, which has implications for those on low wages. Collectively, the stark reality of the
Sheﬃeld City Region ﬁnancial context reveals cuts of »1109 million over a four-year period
Table 3. Sheffield city region income changes (»m): Local Authority Spending and Welfare Cuts (2015).
Local authority
Area
Total spending
2010 (»million)
Total spending
2014 (»million)
Reductions
2010–2014
(»million)
Total est. annual
welfare cuts (2015)
(»million)
Barnsley 196 167 29 86.6
Bassetlaw 20.8 12 8.8 35
Bolsover 13.3 10.3 3 27.0
Chesterfield 21.7 13.5 8.2 35.1
Derbyshire Dales 11.8 7.7 4.0 13.6
Doncaster 528 371 157 104.8
NE Derbyshire 16.8 10.4 6.4 13.6
Rotherham 484 399 85 86.8
Sheffield 970 829 141 162.6
Total 442.4 Approx. 577
Sources: For Local Authority Spending (2010–2014): http://ig.ft.com/sites/2015/local-cuts-checker/#E09000028%23
E09000028 (accessed 16 October 2016).
For welfare reforms: Data provided by Christina Beatty relate to annual changes.
Note: 2015/2016 local authority spending settlement and reductions are not included in this figure.
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set against the much-hyped fanfare of the (oﬀered) »900 million total ‘‘devolution deal’’ (over
30 years). Within the expanded nine local authority social basis of the SCRCA state form, the
gap between devo-rhetoric and austerity-reality could not be greater. Despite this, the
Sheﬃeld LEP Chair has reinforced a neoliberal participatory inclusiveness strategy, where
the ‘‘let’s get it done work-ethic in Sheﬃeld City Region harnesses drive and ambition
[and] with everyone pulling together, and a signiﬁcant sense of community, we are
achieving transformational change’’ (Walsh, 2017: 61).
The role and nature of local authorities (all are represented on the Sheﬃeld City Region
Combined Authority Board) have been diverse and their relationship with the city region
building process in some cases has been ambivalent. On the one hand, local authorities are
managing austerity (but in diﬀerent ways) by moving towards a more ‘‘facilitating’’ and
enabling role in terms of provision of services (CLES, 2014). SCRCA and its local
authorities are ‘‘discursive institutions’’ (Fuller, 2017), discussed above, relaying
depoliticization through the ongoing savage cuts in public-sector budgets, which
contribute directly to their economic agenda by providing opportunities for private proﬁt
(outsourcing and privatization), as well as, on the other hand, providing a critical voice in
relation to increasing poverty and social inequalities.
This dynamic highlights the contradictory ‘‘agent and obstacle’’ nature of the state as a
social relation and the multiple roles that modes of representation can have for opening up
political engagement (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988). Sheﬃeld’s Fairness Commission (see
above) is further illustrative of this, as it promotes inclusion discourses and politics around
alternatives to beneﬁt and welfare cuts but is also a site of tensions and struggles itself.
Stakeholders witness how Sheﬃeld City Council, as well as promoting the growth agenda
through its involvement in the SCRCA, and despite being integral to the Fairness
Commission, bows to the dominant narrative of the necessity of cuts and is actively part
of their implementation.
Pessimism is toxic and we are certainly not conceding ground to the TINA mantra of
‘‘there is no alternative.’’ Our analysis highlights ‘‘the fractures and frictions that create the
space for alternative’’ (Jessop, 2016: 246). The Sheﬃeld City Region is witness to an
increasing lack of buy-in to the neoliberal growth model, which is coalescing around the
local state and the SCRCA local authorities as key agents for counteracting depoliticization
and becoming a space for repoliticization.
First, the Sheﬃeld-centric location of the proposed High-Speed (HS2) transport
connection stations has created agglomeration territorial tensions between the South
Yorkshire councils. Added to this, the cross-border involvement of Chesterﬁeld and
Bassetlaw (which are based in Derbyshire) local authorities in a South Yorkshire deal has
led Derbyshire County Council to seek a (successful) judicial review (on the breadth of the
consultation, on its fairness, on the means used to consult, and on the complexity of the
information surrounding transfer of powers) of this devolution process, eﬀectively putting
back the mayoral election timetable to run the city region’s development corporation. These
‘‘custody battles’’ and ‘‘regional rows’’ (Perraudin, 2016), illustrating how the ‘‘the power of
the state is the power of the forces acting in and through the state’’ (Jessop, 1990: 270), have
increased during 2017 through the ambitions of Barnsley and Doncaster’s local authorities
to be part of a wider Yorkshire Devolution Deal, culminating on the 18 September with their
withdrawal from, and ‘‘derailing’’ of, the SCR devolution process (Burn, 2017). This
triggered central government to withdraw the »900 million ﬁnancial oﬀer, with a possible
mayor de facto powerless, while austerity romps on and the welfare cuts bite deeper.
Second, trade unions, in particular Unite Community, have played a key role in making
connections with, recruiting and involving unemployed people with ‘‘local’’ campaigns
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around beneﬁt sanctions and austerity policies. Third, Barnsley Borough Council has also
developed an alternative employment and skills strategy around ‘‘more and better jobs,’’
recognizing the limits to the city-region growth model and the low-pay low-skills cycle that is
a dominant feature of this economy.
Conclusion
This paper has highlighted the trajectories of a ‘‘post-political’’ approach to city-region
building. ‘‘The post-political condition’’ is clearly seen not to be a coherent institutional-
ﬁx that supports this neoliberal growth project, but is instead like other neoliberalisation
strategies and projects, best regarded as heterogeneous, mutable, and involving variegated
responses and unstable uneven geographical outcomes (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2015).
Here, city-region building frameworks are incapable of addressing the dilemmas associated
with uneven growth and the failure of policies to address deep-rooted problems of labour-
market inequalities that are integral to market, state, and governance failures.
We concur with Darling (2016: 230) that when ‘‘combined with a market-oriented transfer
of responsibilities, depoliticization acts to constrain the possibilities of political debate and
to predetermine the contours of those policy discussions that do take place.’’ We have
discussed how the Sheﬃeld City Region is being depoliticized through state projects and
hegemonic visions, continually generating discourses and narratives on the economy (the
shaping of context, according to Jessop, 2016). Our analysis has though stressed the
importance of considering trends and countertrends and there has been a failure to build
a broad social basis for devolution spatial imaginary initiatives such as the Northern
Powerhouse. Devolution deals are concerned with arrangements for individual city
regions and beyond the aspiration for a larger collective contribution to national
economic output; there is no focus on the relationships with and between city regions and
hence the overall functioning of the economy is bereft of strategic planning (Goodwin et al.,
2017). In eﬀect, there is an asymmetric distribution of powers: the devolution deals
encourage competition over collaboration between city regions, which exacerbates existing
inequalities, whereas the fantasy of ‘‘neoliberalism promises that everyone will win’’ (Dean,
2009: 72) prevails in policy and political discourses. This is heightened by the welfare and
local authority cuts, as many of the policies that previously distributed the proceeds of the
UK’s ﬁnance-centric economic model have been ended by the broader austerity agenda. We
maintain that public sector and public investment should play key roles in supporting and
leading growth, but this stance ‘‘is being directly hampered by a big withdrawal of state
funding for this purpose’’ (RSA, 2016: 6).
We argue that it is essential to continue to ﬁnd ways of working for change from within
the state (in our case, our research situations, leadership roles, and our individual lives in
civil and political society) and ﬁnd ways to develop eﬀective organized oppositional action,
which comes directly out of exposing these contradictions of neoliberalism (see Etherington
and Jones, 2016b). As opposed to ‘‘post-political’’ approaches, which tend to stand outside
of the state, our goal is to ‘‘advocate participation within the mechanisms of power to
intensify their internal contradictions and conﬂicts’’ (Jessop, 1985: 129). In this paper, by
focusing on the Jessop’s ‘‘state as a social relation’’—not as a static ‘‘black box’’ (cf.
Swyngedouw, 2017) but continually materializing as an institutional ensemble and one
where any power distributed through the state only constitutes the power of particular
agents (and their practices) incorporated into its social bases—we have highlighted how
diﬀerent forms of agency are embracing this opportunity, shaping and politicizing the
Sheﬃeld city-region governance landscape.
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We have highlighted how a number of ‘‘bottom-up’’ initiatives have served to develop
counter-hegemonic visions by directly engaging with the city-region devolution agenda,
all of which are forming part of an important repoliticizing of the local state. The task is
to identify further counter-discourses and ideas about a more inclusive city region (RSA,
2017) and consider how these might be ‘‘scaled up’’ from the locally speciﬁc to the general,
to mobilize a broader social base of support (Haughton et al., 2016; RSA, 2016: 11).
Addressing these would, paraphrasing Larner (2014: 203), allow for ‘‘new political
formations [to] emerge,’’ and empower grass-roots democracy via a repoliticized civil
society to recast the ‘‘integral state.’’
We are certainly not arguing that engagement has to be modeled only on the state within
capitalism—a challenge made by Amin and Thrift (2013: 113) in their promotion of what
they call ‘‘liquid models of political organization,’’ some of which are akin to the more
libertarian and revolutionary frameworks advocated by ‘‘post-political’’ commentators
that see limited viability or desirability for these forms of institutionalization (see
Swyngedouw, 2017). We have argued that Jessop’s SRA approach allows for just
this—with the state as ‘‘an institutionally diverse form of political organization that can
be more open and ﬂexible than the standard state form’’ (Swyngedouw, 2017: 113)—and we
encourage constructive discussion and debate on advancing this and other frameworks to get
a handle on the ‘‘post-political’’ depoliticized state in, and of, contemporary capitalism.
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Notes
1. Rancie`re (1999, 2010) makes a distinction between politics, defined as the sheer contingency of any
social order, and police, defined not as a profession but the internal relations and constituent parts
of society that give value to social roles, orders, conducts, and boundaries. Recent interventions in
the debate on politicizing the city through urban theory and practice reduce ‘‘the state’’ and
‘‘policy’’ to the police, which misses the social and institutional materiality of the state and
particularly how depoliticization operates in and through the state (see Beveridge and Koch,
2017; Swyngedouw, 2017).
2. The research involved: a policy scoping of qualitative and quantitative sources; narrative policy
analysis and discourse analysis, undertaken alongside stakeholder mapping to capture both the
employment and skills policies flowing through the Sheffield city region as well as actors (policy-
makers, practitioners, and stakeholders in general); 30 semi-structured interviews with key actors
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operating across the SCR; and a focus group involving unemployed participants randomly assigned
from records held by Sheffield College.
3. See ONS May 2015.
4. Sheffield’s Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre (AMRC), the ‘‘jewel in the crown’’ (Caborn,
2017: 18) of the SCR knowledge-based economy, is located on the former Orgreave Coking Plant site,
which featured strongly in the 1980s miners’ strike. Now renamed ‘‘Waverley,’’ this site is owned and
developed by the Harworth Group (Peel Holdings)—a major player in the privatization (with the aid
of the British state and European structural funding) of public infrastructure land assets across
England (Harrison, 2014)—deploying ‘‘state power to further their interests’’ (Dean, 2009: 12). This
is running alongside Boeing’s use of Waverley as an emerging military industrial complex.
5. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/jobseekers-allowance-sanctions (accessed 21 February
2016).
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